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anticipated by him, the continuance of the trust would defeat
or substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes
of the trust, the proper court shall direct or permit the ter-
mination of the trust, in whole or in part.'8
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
In Saunier v. Saunier,9 the question arose as to proper dis-
position of refunds on taxes paid to the United States govern-
ment during the existence of the community. A contract between
husband and wife was made a part of the separation judgment
and provided that the wife would get certain real estate in addi-
tion to a cash settlement and that the remainder of the com-
munity property would belong to the husband. The court held
that the refund was the property of the husband and that the
sum of money which she received might be pleaded in compensa-
tion for judgment to pay alimony to her for their children.
TORTS
Wex S. Malone*
A spare handful of torts cases reached the supreme court
during the past term, and of these, only one was of outstanding
importance.' By and large, the cases merely afford new illustra-
tions of familiar rules and tendencies.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY
Moore v. Blanchard2 was a case in which a bouncer employed
by defendant, who was keeper of a night club, assaulted and
seriously injured the plaintiff, a customer. The controversy was
decided by a jury, which awarded more than $4,000 in damages.
On appeal to the court of appeal 3 the damages were reduced to
$1,000 for a rather startling reason. The court observed that
night clubs are rowdy places by nature and the task of maintain-
ing order is a difficult one. Therefore, if employees hired to
maintain peace and protect customers "unconsciously exceed the
authority which they have under the law" their employer, who
is subject only to vicarious liability, is entitled to the compassion
of the court and should not be required to pay the full extent of
the actual damage inflicted.
18. Ibid.
19. 47 So. 2d 19 (La. 1950).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Brantley v. Clarkson, 217 La. 425, 46 So. 2d 614 (1950). See p. 191, infra.
2. 216 La. 253, 43 So. 2d 599 (1949).
3. 35 So. 2d 667 (La. App. 1948).
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This solicitude for the interest of those who provide places
for the sale and consumption of intoxicating liquors was prop-
erly discountenanced by the supreme court. The opinion ob-
served that the only mitigating circumstance recognized with
reference to damages in an assault case is the provocation of the
victim. It might properly have added that an establishment that
profits from the intoxication of others should be prepared to pay
in full for the risks which are reasonably incident to the stuff
it sells. 4
EXTRAHAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES
On numerous occasions in the past our courts have not hesi-
tated to impose strict liability on businesses that undertake to
deal in any way with electricity, gas or other dangerous sub-
stances. The liability is almost that of an insurer, although the
decisions are couched in terms of negligence, fortified by the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
This idea of strict liability was again emphasized in Olive-
dell Planting Company v. Town of Lake Providence." Plaintiff's
property was destroyed by fire which was caused by a short cir-
cuit between primary and secondary power lines of defendant
town. Negligence was found from the failure to suspend the lines
a sufficient distance above the highway, so that one of the wires
was broken by a passing truck. The short circuit did not occur
until several weeks later when the insulation on the broken wire
finally eroded. Failure to inspect and absence of circuit breaking
equipment were also chargeable to defendant.
In Henrikson v. Herrin Transfer and Warehouse Company,
Incorporated,7 the court found that the employees of defendant,
a moving concern, were negligent in attempting to disconnect a
kitchen range supplied by butane gas when they were aware
that the supply had not been cut off. The owner was also aware
of the danger and she had encouraged the employees to take the
chance. For this reason the court held that her own contributory
negligence precluded recovery for the consequent destruction of
her residence when the gas exploded. It is difficult to agree with
4. In several states, establishments selling intoxicating liquors are made
liable by statute for all torts committed by intoxicated customers, irrespec-
tive of any lack of fault on the part of the seller. Ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-
Hurd, 1934) c. 43, § 135. Appleman, Civil Liability under Illinois Dramshop
Act, 34 Ill. L. Rev. 30 (1939).
5. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference, 4 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 70 (1941).
6. 47 So. 2d 23 (La. 1950).
7. 216 La. 199, 43 So. 2d 471 (1949).
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the court's conclusion that the amateur home owner, rather than
the professional mover who represents himself as having special
knowledge and skill in such matters, should bear the risk of an
accident of this type. She was entitled to expect that the superior
judgment of the professional would prompt him to adopt neces-
sary measures for her protection, even though she was willing
for him to take the chance. The fact that defendant's employees
were ignorant men who were content to accept the plaintiff's
suggestions does not seem to alter the matter, for it is the obliga-
tion of a concern that trafficks in this dangerous sort of business
to supply workers who can and will exercise a sound independent
judgment.
NUISANCE
Although the entire field of torts law may appropriately be
regarded as an effort to balance the interests of the plaintiff
against those of the defendant, yet in most areas of torts law the'
economic and ethical factors that enter each side of the scale lie
outside of the theories, formulas and rules employed by courts
in articulating judgment, and show dimly, if at all, through them.8
When, however, the conflicting interests of neighboring land-
owners come before courts for adjustment, the balancing process
often becomes so delicate and the points of adjustment vary so
immensely from case to case that the task of reconciliation places
too great a burden-on the orthodox language technique of the
law. Hence rules and doctrines are largely abandoned and the
factors that motivate judgment emerge to the surface for open
consideration. The handful of platitudes, whether of codal or
common law origin, that constitute the law of nuisance are pur-
posefully couched in such nebulous phrases that a court is free
to pass an individual human judgment in each controversy and
to expose the trump cards in the hands of both opponents.,
O'Neal v. Southern Carbon Company,'0 a recent nuisance
decision, represents an instance where the court doubted that the
carbon manufacturing company was a substantial source of the
soot which interfered with the plaintiff's enjoyment of his resi-
dential property and which was alleged to be a nuisance. Other
sources of this annoyance were called to the court's attention.
Furthermore, on a balancing of interests it appeared that a refusal
of injunctive relief would be proper. Defendant's plant was
8. Green, Judge and Jury, 19, 74-76 (1930).
9. Prosser, Torts, § 73 (1941).
10. 216 La. 96, 43 So. 2d 230 (1949).
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located in an appropriate area conveniently near the source of
raw materials for its operations, and the plaintiff's dwelling was
in a sparsely settled community. The presence of smoke from
other sources indicated that an abatement of defendant's plant
would not afford the plaintiff any substantial relief. It was also
shown that the establishment was operated carefully and in
accord with the best practices.
LIABILITY OF MUNICIPALITIES
Although cities and towns are regarded as being under a
duty to maintain streets and sidewalks in reasonably safe condi-
tion, yet the requirement is not a very exacting one in practice.
If the defect in the public way is not glaring, the court is likely
to deny recovery. This solicitude for the public body has been
expressed in the decisions in various ways. The fact that the
municipality must have notice, either express or implied, is
sometimes emphasized. At other times it has been said that the
defect must be one that is not trivial, or is not to be expected.
Frequently the pedestrian is denied recovery because he failed
to look out for himself. Despite the fact that our supreme court
announced nearly thirty years ago in Lemoine v. City of Alex-
andria" that a pedestrian "has the right to assume that the road-
way is safe for travel," the courts have since excused cities for
minor sidewalk defects by blaming the pedestrian.
The recent case, White v. City of Alexandria,12 is only an-
other illustration of what was observed above. A sidewalk slab
was elevated above the contiguous slabs by a difference varying
from one-half inch to two inches. This caused injury to plaintiff,
an aged woman who was proceeding to church and was concen-
trating on the possibility of being late. The court managed to
pay its respects to the Lemoine decision and at the same time
deny recovery by observing:
"Such ways of passage are intended for public use, of course,
and a pedestrian is entitled to assume that they are not dan-
gerous. Further, he is not required to constantly observe the
surface of the walk or to exercise the care that would be
necessary in traversing a jungle. However, he cannot be
completely oblivious of its condition; he must exercise ordi-
nary care when using it, having in mind the well recognized
fact that throughout every city of any size in this state there
11. 151 La. 562, 92 So. 58 (1922).
12. 216 La. 308, 43 So. 2d 618 (1949).
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exist irregularities in the walk ways brought about by natural
causes such as rains, expansion, soil erosion and tree roots.' '1 3
VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR TORTS OF FAMILY
The effort of courts to place the financial solvency of the
family behind the injuries inflicted by family members while
operating vehicles has given rise to one of the most colorful
chapters in American tort history. In most jurisdictions this end
was achieved through the evolution of a doctrinal hybrid known
as the "family purpose doctrine," which is a distortion of the law
of agency designed to make each driving member of the family
the servant of the family head so long as the car was being used
for the general pleasure of the family. 14
In Louisiana this fiction was rejected,15 perhaps for the reason
that the demand for its use was not so urgent as in other juris-
dictions. Our Civil Code subjects parents to liability for all torts
of their minor children, 16 and this covers the principle area served
elsewhere by the family purpose doctrine. However, this left the
family assets free from the claim of a victim of the wife's care-
less driving.
In an effort to plug this hole in the dike our supreme court
evolved a doctrine which was stranger and more cumbersome to
administer than even the family purpose doctrine of other states.
This was the "community errand" doctrine, formulated in the
leading case, Adams v. G olson.'7 The court announced in that
case that the husband could be held, as head and master of the
community, for the tortious acts of his wife if it was shown that
at the time these acts were committed she was, with the express
or implied consent of her husband, attending to the business or
affairs of the community. In that case, however, the court found
that the wife was engaged in a mission for her own pleasure at
the time of the accident, hence the community was not liable.
Thereafter it became necessary to determine in each case
whether the wife was acting for the community or was merely
engaged in a private errand. The confusion that followed is well
illustrated in Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. Simms.'
In that case the wife had undertaken a trip in the family car to
13. 216 La. 308, 314, 43 So. 2d 618, 620 (1949).
14. Lattin, Vicarious Liability and the Family Automobile, 26 Mich. L.
Rev. 846 (1928).
15. See Adams v. Golson, 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937).
16. Art. 2318, La. Civil Code of 1870. Note, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 478
(1945).
17. 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937).
18. 200 So. 34 (La. App. 1941).
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visit relatives. Before departing, however, she found it was
necessary to have a minor repair made on the vehicle and it was
while attempting to negotiate an entrance to a local repair shop
that she carelessly injured the plaintiff. The court found that
the journey to repair the family car was merely incidental to
her private mission. It could just as easily have found to the
contrary. Certainly this was no satisfactory basis on which to
administer controversies that involve large damage claims. Even
the bastard "family purpose doctrine" involves no such nonsense.
Fortunately, the supreme court has reconsidered the Golson
case in the recent decision, Brantley v. Clarkson.19 Brantley was
injured through the careless driving of Mrs. Clarkson, who was
returning home from a social visit to a neighbor. The court
might have dallied with the Golson doctrine by emphasizing that
she was returning to her home and domestic duties, and hence
was engaged in a community errand. Instead, the court placed
the law in proper perspective by expressing its dissatisfaction
with the Golson rule as previously announced:
"If the husband, in using a car belonging to the community,
commits a tort while on an errand in which he is to indulge
in his own pleasures and recreation and thereby becomes
liable, there is no reason which suggests itself why the same
community, out of which the liability may have to be paid,
should not likewise be liable for a tort committed by the
wife under the same circumstances. ' 20
As a result, the Louisiana courts are now in complete accord
with the rule known in other states as the "family purpose doc-
trine," although the rationale of that doctrine has been repudi-
ated in this state.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Wex S. Malone*
Although our courts have consistently held that the use and
operation of a motor vehicle by a business serves to classify the
business as hazardous,1 it has recently announced that a feed
store (which is not expressly listed as hazardous in the Com-
pensation Act) does not become subject to the act by reason of
19. 217 La. 425, 46 So. 2d 614 (1950).
20. 46 So. 2d 614, 617 (La. 1950).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Malone, Hazardous Businesses and Employments under the Louisiana
Workmen's Compensation Law, 22 Tulane L. Rev. 412, 418 (1948).
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